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Abstract
We develop and illustrate a method for the joint
planning of natural gas and electric power systems that
are subject to spatially correlated failures of the kind
that would be expected to occur in the case of extreme
weather events. Our approach utilizes a two-stage
stochastic planning and operations framework for a
jointly planned and operated gas and electric power
transmission system. Computational tractability is
achieved through convex relaxations of the natural gas
flow equations and the use of a machine learning
algorithm to reduce the set of possible contingencies.
We illustrate the method using a small test system used
previously in the literature to evaluate computational
performance of joint gas-grid models. We find that
planning for geographically correlated failures rather
than just random failures reduces the level of unserved
energy relative to planning for random (spatially
uncorrelated failures). Planning for geographically
correlated failures, however, does not eliminate the




Ne Set of electric power buses (nodes)
Ω Set of power generators
Ωgf Set of gas-fired power generators, Ωg ⊆ Ω
Ωngf Set of non-gas-fired power generators, Ωng ⊆
Ω
Γi Set of generators connected to bus i
Nei Set of buses connected to bus i by an edge
Ae Set of power transmission lines
Power System Parameters
δ0 Index of the reference bus
P li Nodal active power load at bus i
P ei , P
e
i Active power generation limits of generator i
Ci1, C
i
2 Cost coefficients of power generator i
Hi Heat rate coefficient of gas-fired power
generators
Xij Reactance of a transmission line
Fij Thermal limit/capacity of a transmission line
M A large penalty constant for Big M method
Power System Variables
pij,k Active power of a transmission line in event k
pej,k Active power output of generator j in event k
θi,k Phase angle at bus i in event k
usei,k Unserved electricity demand of node i in event
k
Natural Gas System Sets
Ng Set of natural gas junctions (nodes)
Ag Set of all links joining a pair of junctions
Ti Set of gas-fired power plants connected to node
i
Ap Set of base pipelines, subset of Ag
Ac Set of base compressors, subset of Ag
Natural Gas System Parameters
Wa Pipeline resistance (Weymouth) factor
PDij , PDij Pressure drop limits from junction i to
juntion j
πi, πi Squared pressure limits at junction i
αcij , α
c
ij Compression limits squared at compressor
station
Di Firm gas consumption at junction i
Di, Di Gas consumption limits at junction i
Si, Si Gas product limits at junction i
Yi Cost coefficient of gas production at junction i
Natural Gas System Variables
πi,k Squared pressure of gas node i in event k
xij,k Gas flow on pipelines and compressors in event
k
λij,k Auxiliary relaxation variable in event k





di,k Gas consumption at junction i in event k
si,k Gas production at junction i in event k
y+ij,k, y
−
ij,k Binary flow direction for links in event k
Extreme Events and Expansion Sets
k ∈ K Set of extreme weather and climate events
Λt Set of transmission expansion candidates
Λp Set of pipeline expansion candidates
Φtk Set of transmission lines impacted in event k
Φpk Set of pipelines impacted in event k
Extreme Events and Expansion Parameters
βpij Expansion cost of a pipeline
βtij Expansion cost of a transmission line
η Penalty cost for 1 MWh of unserved energy
STij,k Binary status of an existing line in event k
SPij,k Binary status of existing pipelines in event k
Extreme Events and Expansion Variables
usei,k Unserved electricity demand of node i in event
k
usgi,k Unserved gas demand of junction i in event k
zpij Binary expansion decision for pipeline
candidates
ztij Binary expansion decision for transmission line
candidates
1. Introduction
Recent reports [1] [2] as well as experiences in Texas
[3] and the U.S. Northeast [?] have shown that the
U.S. energy system is vulnerable to extreme weather
and climate events (EWCE). The increasing frequency
of EWCE has led to public-sector actors at the federal
level [4], [1], [5], state level [6] [?], [7] as well
as utilities [8] to focus on planning critical energy
infrastructure around such extreme events. Noting
that planning for EWCE resilience requires different
approaches than traditional power-sector generation or
transmission planning, these actors have highlighted
needs for vulnerability assessments including needs for
vulnerability assessments and ways to identify optimal
resilience measures.
Incorporating the risk of extreme weather and
climate events into energy system planning process
is a challenging task because EWCE are high-impact
and low probability events; because the risk of such
events is non-stationary in a changing climate [9];
and a single event can include multiple types of
extreme weather (floods and landslides, for example)
and multiple interconnected systems whose impacts
compound on one another. This paper addresses a gap in
the literatures on power system resilience and on models
of coupled electricity and gas systems. We formulate
and implement a joint planning and operations model
for coupled gas-grid systems that is able to capture
EWCE whose location and severity are uncertain and
can result in spatially correlated outages that may not be
captured in N-k types of planning models. Our approach
utilizes a stochastic optimization formulation and a
novel scenario-reduction approach based in machine
learning.
2. Literature Review
The literature on planning for resilience has focused
on quantifying vulnerability and enhancing resilience
under low-probability and high-impact contingency
scenarios for power systems. Some of literature
does consider EWCE risk on the power system [10]
[11][12]. Other power system models are planning
models with operation stages where post-contingency
dispatch model runs to determine the minimum possible
impact during extreme events. The models vary greatly
by the size [10][13] and components of power grids as
well as the type of threats including natural disasters
[14] and terrorism attacks[15][16]. For example, [17]
proposed a distribution network planning model to
minimize damage from hurricanes while [18] modeled
transmission network under high wind events. To model
the impact of natural hazards on power system, many
studies have employed a similar framework: threat
prediction, components exposure and vulnerability,
system response, and system restoration [19]. Threats
from natural hazards can be modeled as one type of
hazard at a time, the most common approach, or as
simultaneous weather and climate events. It is important
to evaluate the joint probability and consequences when
infrastructure systems are planned because catastrophic
damage from compound extreme events is bigger than
sum of individual extreme events[9]. [12] assessed the
potential impact of windstorms on transmission lines
and towers as well as the impact of floods on substations
and power plants.
There are short-term resilience measures before,
during or after the EWCE such as reserve planning and
allocation of repair crews [18]and long-term resilience
measures such as installing energy storage or new
transmission lines [20]. Resilience measures can
also be categorized as building new infrastructure or
hardening existing infrastructure. These measures are
evaluated by running operation models to compare
their effectiveness[12] or by robust optimization or
stochastic optimization methods when considering the
uncertainty of EWCE. Sequential or non-sequential
Monte Carlo (MC) algorithm techniques are employed
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to account for uncertainty of extreme weather and
climate events [21]. Sequential MC is necessary
if the model considers restoration processes such as
including constraints of repairing crew number/resource
or travel time to repair location [22]. Spatial or
temporal components can be incorporated into the
model indirectly by using historical or predictive
geographic-specific extreme weather and climate events
data [10]. With the uncertainty of EWCE included,
resilience planning model is commonly formulated as
a defender-attacker-defender game model[17] which is
usually a two-stage robust optimization model. The
defender plans system expansion based on the worst
case scenario where the attacker causes the maximum
damage. Among all uncertain scenarios, the defender
redispatches the power system to reduce the damage
as much as possible. The Column and Constraint
Generation algorithm is usually used to solve the robust
optimization problem [17]. For the problem that is
formulated as a stochastic optimization model, [20]
uses Optimization via Simulation method to solve and
[23] constructed a heuristic method to find the solution
strategy.
A gap in the literature on coupled gas-grid
planning in particular that our approach seeks to fill
is incorporating resiliency as a planning objective
instead of solely minimizing total cost to meet energy
demand. [24] designed a combined electricity and
gas expansion model (CEGE) to satisfy coincident
high demand scenarios and designed test system for
the United States using publicly available data. The
electricity system is integrated with natural gas system
via the heat rate coefficients of gas-fired power plants.
The CEGE model was then updated to add gas-price
elasticity caused by congestion on existing models
[25]. However, most existing models do not consider
resilience as a constraint or an objective except the
integrated model in [14][26]. [14] and [26] both build
a tri-level two-stage robust optimization model for joint
power and gas model. [14] assumes that the natural
gas pipelines are robust to natural disasters and harden
the power system by replacing transmission lines with
underground gas pipelines. In [26], both power and gas
system components are vulnerable to natural disasters,
but the spatial correlation of outages resulted from
natural disasters are not studied.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section III provides the mathematical formulation for
the stochastic optimization problem while Section IV
describes the experimental design of how to simulate
the EWCE with the test system. Simulation results
and conclusions are presented in section V and VI
respectively.
3. Model Formulation
In this section, we provided the formulation for a
two-stage stochastic optimization model of joint power
and gas system. The equations for the operation stage
will hold for all scenarios in the set of extreme weather
and climate events K.
3.1. Constraints for Gas System
The gas flow balance is preserved at junctions by the
following constraints.













xij,k = 0 ∀i ∈ Ng
(1)
The binary flow direction variables need to be
constrained for all pairs of links between the nodes
including pipelines and compressors.
y+ij,k + y
−










ij,k = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ A
c (4)
The flow direction in pipelines should aligns with the
sign of the flow. Equations (5) and (6) represent those
constraints that apply for both existing pipelines and
new pipelines. The pressure drop across pipelines are
consistent with the sign of the flow as in equation (7) and





Si ≤ xij,k (5)




(1− y+ij,k)(πi − πi) ≤ πi,k − πj,k (7)
πi,k − πj,k ≤ (1− y−ij,k)(πi − πi) (8)
Weymouth equations make sure that the gas flow in
a pipeline satisfy the physical constraints of fluid
mechanics. Because the Weymouth equation is not
convex, we use bilinear relaxations introduced by
McCormick and the second-order cone relaxation which
is often tight for expansion planning problem. The
relaxation variable λij,k is in 〈y+ij,k − y
−
ij,k, πi,k −
πj,k〉, which are represented by equations (9)-(12). The
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relaxation applies to both existing pipelines and pipeline
candidates.




















ij,k ∀(i, j) ∈ Λp
(14)
Limits on natural gas compression are ensured by
Eqs.(15)-(18).
πj,k − αcijπi,k ≤ (1− y
+
ij,k)πj (15)
πcijπi,k − πj,k ≤ (1− y+ij,k)πi (16)
πi,k − πj,k ≤ (1− y−ij,k)πi (17)
πj,k − πi,k ≤ (1− y−ij,k)πj (18)
Additional constrains below are supposed to ensure no





Si ≤ xij,k ≤ zpij
∑
i∈Ng
Si ∀(i, j) ∈ Λp
(19)
Consumption, production and pressure should fall
within the limits for each gas junction. For junctions
with fixed gas consumption, the difference between
fixed gas consumption and the amount of gas demand
that is met is the quantity of unserved gas demand as in
Eq.(20). For junctions with flexible gas consumption,
which are junctions connected to gas-fired power plants,
the variable gas consumption is between the nodal gas
consumption bounds as in Eq.(21).
Di ≤ di,k ≤ Di (20)
di,k + usgi,k = Di (21)
πi ≤ πi,k ≤ πi (22)
Si ≤ si,k ≤ Si (23)
3.2. Constraints for Power System
The power system is represented by a DC power
flow model. Eq.(24) enforces that the total flow into a
node equals the total flow out of the node for all power
nodes. The electricity demand that is not satisfied is
represented by the unserved electricity to balance the
nodal flow. Eqs.(25) and (26), and Eqs.(27) and (28)
define the power flow equations via the Big M method




















≤ (1− STij,k)M (26)







≤ (1− z2ij)M (28)
Eqs. (29)-(32) describe the bounds on the power
system variables. Eq.(30) ensures that no power flows
through a transmission line if the transmission line is
down during the extreme event k. Eq.(31) ensures that
there is no electricity going through a new transmission
line if it is not being built. Eq.(33) sets the phase angle
of a slack bus to be 0 as a reference.
P ei ≤ pei,k ≤ P ei ∀i ∈ Ω (29)
−STij,kVij ≤ pij,k ≤ STij,kVij ∀ (i, j) ∈ Ae
(30)
−ztijSij ≤ pij,k ≤ ztijSij ∀ (i, j) ∈ Λt
(31)
0 ≤ usei,k ≤ P li ∀i ∈ Ne (32)
θδ0,k = 0 ∀k ∈ K (33)
3.3. Coupling Constraint between Power
System and Gas System
The gas system and electricity system are connected
because gas system supplies fuel to gas-fired power
plants. This is reflected by the constraint of power
output and gas demand of power plants. The equality
results in non-convexity. Therefore, we relax the






Hj × pej,k i ∈ Ng (34)
3.4. Extreme Weather and Climate Events
The binary status variables represent whether the
components fail during an extreme weather and climate
event. The status of energy system components
is determined by the location of system component
and event impacted region. If the component is
within the region impacted by EWCE, the pipelines
or transmission lines fail and will not have power
or gas flow going through. Otherwise, the status
parameter equals one representing that the component
fully functions. We assume that the pipeline and
transmission line candidates are designed to be robust
and resilient to both geographically correlated failures
and uncorrelated failures. They will always function in
the operation stage if they are chosen to be built in the
first stage.
STij,k = 0 if∀(i, j) ∈ φtk, ∀k ∈ K (35)
SPij,k = 0 if∀(i, j) ∈ φpk, ∀k ∈ K (36)
3.5. Objective Function
Objective function for the stochastic optimization
model is stated in Eq.(37). It composes the expected
operating cost and penalty cost for unserved energy of
all possible scenarios in the operation stage and the



































4. experimental design/ test cases
The test system we use was developed in [27]. The
power network is the IEEE 14 bus test system and the
gas network is a representation of Belgium natural gas
system[28]. The size of the test system is small with
14 electric buses and 20 natural gas junctions. The
locations of the power and gas network is shown in
Figure 1. The electric buses that have gas-fired power
plants and the gas junctions that supply gas to power
system are circled in the Figure 1. Because of their
geographic proximity, the transportation of gas from
gas junction to gas-fired power plants are assumed to
be functioning even if the extreme weather and climate
events hit the area. In other words, as long as the gas
junctions next to the electricity nodes have gas supply,
the gas will have access to gas-fired power plants.
Figure 1. Joint Power and Gas System
Figure 2. 100 Extreme Weather and Climate Event
Centers with One Event as Example
The fundamental contingency feature that we
consider in this paper is the spatial correlation
of the location of the energy system components
that are impacted in the contingency events. The
extreme weather and climate events induce spatially
correlated contingency events while most existing N-k
contingency planning assumes the uncorrelatedness
in the geographical distribution of the component
failures. Therefore, we use geographically correlated
failures(GCF) and geographically uncorrelated
failures(UCF) to represent the extreme weather
and climate events and contingency events in traditional
N-k planning method respectively. Specifically, one
EWCE is represented by an area/square area within
where transmission lines and pipelines are affected.
Multiple EWCEs that intersect with the scope of the
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test system are generated randomly using Monte Carlo
to represent the uncertainty of climate risk. During
each Monte Carlo run, a random event center with
coordinate information is generated within the border of
Belgium. A square box of a uniform size centering on
the event center is defined as the extreme weather and
climate event area. Transmission lines and pipelines
intersecting the event area fail and stop functioning.
The 100 extreme weather and climate event centers that
we generated are presented in Figure 2.
To research the difference between two types of
failure modes GCF and UCF, a set of equivalent
contingency scenarios with geographically uncorrelated
failures that have the same distribution of number of
failed components are generated. The distribution
of number of failed components is shown in Figure
3. Based on the number of failed transmission line
and pipelines in GCF, same number of transmission
lines and pipelines are randomly selected to be the
failed components in the equivalent scenario with UCF.
Therefore, there is no spatial correlation between failed
components. We compare both the impact of two
types of failure modes before the expansion and the
investment decisions from the stochastic optimization
model planning against the two types of contingency
scenarios. To compare the joint system resilience
against the two type of disasters, we run an one-stage
operation model with base network structure under 100
GCF events and 100 UCF events. The metrics we used
for comparison include the total cost or total unserved
energy as well as the spatial distribution of unserved
energy across gas consumer nodes and electricity
demand nodes. We also look into the allocation of
total unserved energy between two subsystems and the
resilience of individual subsystem against two types of
contingencies.
Figure 3. Distribution of Number of Failed
Components for 100 Contingency Scenarios
The expansion model is a two-stage deterministic
equivalent stochastic optimization model. The first
stage is the planning stage to determine the investment
decisions of natural gas pipelines and transmission lines
while the second stage is an operation stage to redispatch
the electricity and gas systems to have the minimal loss
of load in each contingency scenario. The scenarios in
the second stage are selected by the Approximate Latent
Factor Algorithm (ALFA) from the set of 100 UCF
and the set of 100 GCF scenarios that are generated by
Monte Carlo. The scenario reduction method is needed
because the uncertainty of EWCE locations for GCF
and the possible combinations of failed components for
UCF makes it critical to incorporate several scenarios
while including many scenarios results in the heavy
computational burden because of the non-linearity of the
gas system and joint operation of two subsystems.ALFA
is a method rooted in multivariate statistics, and it
provides a set of scenarios and weights that can be
incorporated into planning formulations[29]. After
solving the stochastic optimization mode, the resilience
of the expanded network based on the planning model
against GCF and the planning model against UCF will
be tested against the same set of 100 GCFs and 100
UCFs.
The flow diagrams in 4 and 5 summarize the
steps of impact comparison and comparison of network
expansion decisions. A detailed description about the
flow diagrams are also written as the numbered lists
below.
Figure 4. Flow diagram of impact comparison
4.1. Comparison of Impact from Component
Failures
1. Generate 100 extreme weather and climate event
areas within the model scope using Monte Carlo.
2. Run the operation model under 100 contingency
scenarios with geographically correlated failures
for base network without network expansion.
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3. Generate 100 equivalent contingency scenarios of
uncorrelated failures with the same distribution of
number of failed components.
4. Run the operation model under 100 scenarios
under 100 uncorrelated failures for the base
network without network additions.
5. Compare the impact of GCF and UCF on system
using metrics including: total unserved energy,
total system cost and average electricity price,
nodal unserved energy and Gini coefficients of
unserved energy as a way to measure spatial
distribution.
Figure 5. Flow diagram of expansion comparison
4.2. Comparison of Stochastic Network
Hardening Decisions
1. Sample network expansion decisions as potential
future network structures.
2. Run the operation model to obtain the two
impact matrices with total cost as matrix entries
for contingency scenarios with geographically
correlated failures and uncorrelated failures for
sample network structures.
3. Use Approximate Latent Factor Algorithm to
select the representative contingency scenarios
based on the cost matrix.
4. Run the deterministic equivalent for MINLP
model under GCF and UCF with reduced
contingency scenarios to get the expansion
decisions.
5. Run the operation model under the GCF and UCF
contingency scenarios with the two expanded
network based on GCF planning model and UCF
planning model to calculate the unserved energy.
6. Compare the expansion decisions from GCF and
UCF planning models.
7. Run the operation model with the two expanded
network structure to compare the resilience
enhanced especially the amount of unserved
energy reduced through network expansion.
5. Numerical Results
As described in the previous section, the
experimental design is composed of impact comparison
of joint system under geographically correlated failures
and uncorrelated failures and comparison of planning
model results. The results from impact comparison
shows the vulnerability of existing network structure
and proves the necessity of system planning processing
considering extreme weather and climate events.
5.1. Comparison of Impact Results
Figure 6 captures the scenario-wise unserved
electricity and gas demand from each contingency
scenario. The unserved electricity demand accounts for
a high percentage of total unserved energy demand in
scenarios with GCF. Among contingency scenarios with
UCF, the unserved electricity demand is relatively low
even when the system has high total unserved energy
demand. This verifies that the power system is designed
to be robust to spatially uncorrelated failures but not to
correlated failures. The unserved gas demand accounts
for a high percentage of total unserved energy under
UCF, which can be explained by the high number of gas
junctions with unserved gas demand.
To evaluate the spatial distribution of unserved
energy across nodes, we use Gini coefficients as a
measure. The formulation we use is im Eq (38).
The higher the Gini coefficient, the greater the spatial








The cumulative distributions of Gini coefficients for
gas demand nodes and electricity demand nodes under
GCF and UCF are presented in Figure 7. First,
regardless of the failure mode, the concentration of the
unserved energy demand is high, which is a result of
the small scale of the test system. Second, contingency
scenarios with geographically correlated failures are
more likely to have higher Gini coefficients as compared
to uncorrelated failures. Third, the power system is
more likely to yield a high Gini coefficient, which is
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Figure 6. Stackplot of Unserved Energy
consistent with the redundancies built into the power
network structure. Because an electricity demand node
is less likely to be cut off from the grid entirely, the
probability of having multiple electricity demand nodes
being cut off is low. The unserved electricity demand
is more likely to be concentrated in fewer number of
nodes, which results in a high Gini coefficient.
5.2. Comparison of Expansion Results
For the same base network, the two-stage stochastic
optimization model is run to obtain the expansion
decisions on pipeline and transmission candidates.
Because the test system is small, we assume an uniform
price for all gas pipeline candidates and another price
for all transmission line candidates. The MINLP model
is solved with BARON solver. The planning model
takes less than 2 hours to reach a solution, and unserved
energy is driven to zero for all solutions.
The set of pipeline candidates and transmission line
candidates is the same as the set of existing pipelines and
transmission lines for the test system. The difference is
Figure 7. Gini Coefficients Comparison
that the sets of candidates are robust enough to operate
normally in contingency scenarios with GCF or UCF.
The locations of these candidates chosen are presented
in 8. There are five transmission lines being built from
the planning model with GCF scenarios with uncertainty
while there are only two transmission lines being built
from that with UCF scenarios with uncertainty. Even
though there are more lines being built in the GCF
planning model, the set of two candidates chosen in the
UCF planning model is not a subset of five candidates
chosen in the GCF planning model. Thus,= planning
for GCF does more than simply add extra redundancy
as compared to planning for UCF. Seven pipelines are
built from planning model with GCF or UCF scenarios.
There is overlap between the new pipelines built, but the
set of candidates chosen to be built is not identical in the
two planning approaches.
After the system expansion, we test if the expanded
network based on GCF or UCF planning is resilient
to the two types of failures. We simulate operations
of each of the post-expansion networks to the sets of
GCF and UCF failures. Table 1 and Table 2 present
the magnitude and and proportion of reduction of total
unserved energy after system expansion based on GCF
and UCF. Table 1 presents the reduction in unserved
energy for a GCF-planned system that is subject to both
GCF and UCF contingencies post-expansion. Table
2 presents the same information for a UCF-planned
system. The Contingency Type column refers to
whether the post-expansion system is subjected to GCF
or UCF contingencies.
The expanded system based on planning considering
contingency uncertainty with GCF reduces unserved
energy effectively when facing geographically
correlated failures. Unserved energy is reduced by
100% after expansion (i.e., post-expansion unserved
energy is zero even in the face of contingencies) for
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Figure 8. Locations of Expansion Decisions When
Planning for GCF (Top) and UCF (Bottom)
more than 50% of the scenarios with unserved energy
facing GCF. Planning against UCF is able to enhance
the network robustness but cannot reduce the unserved
energy by 100% when the system faces GCF. On
the other hand, when the expanded network faces
UCF, the planning considering GCF or UCF has a
comparable performance. A reasonable explanation
is that same number of pipelines are being built and
more transmission lines are being built based on
planning model considering GCF. Therefore, planning
considering GCF does reduce unserved energy when
facing UCF, but it is not cost-effective comparing to
planning considering UCF. With the same budget, the
planning model only considering GCF might have
a worse performance in reducing unserved energy
demand under UCF.
Table 1. Resilience of Expanded System Under
Planning for GCF
Contingency Type Min 25% 50% 75% Max
GCF in GWh 0.0 11.6 116.0 256.4 421.8
GCF in % 0% 37.8% 100% 100% 100%
UCF in GWh 0.0 22.0 27.2 178.2 316.6
UCF in % 0% 48.5% 89.7% 100% 100%
Table 2. Resilience of Expanded System Under
Planning for UCF
Contingency Type Min 25% 50% 75% Max
GCF in GWh 0.0 0.0 57.4 250.3 256.4
GCF in % 0% 0% 60.3% 94.5% 100%
UCF in GWh 0.0 21.6 39.6 200.1 399.2
UCF in % 0% 69.6% 100% 100% 100%
6. Conclusions
The joint power and gas system shows vulnerability
to both geographically correlated failures and
uncorrelated failures. It is important to consider
the low-probability and high-impact events in the
system planning process. The power system is
relatively resilient to uncorrelated failures comparing
to geographically correlated failures because the N-k
contingency analysis has been used in the planning
process. The gas system shows vulnerability to both
geographically correlated and uncorrelated failures.
The difference in power and gas system robustness
can be explained by their network topology. The mesh
structure of the power system with high degree of
connectivity is more resistant to contingency scenarios
than the tree topology of the gas system. But the fuel
dependency of power system on natural gas system is
implicitly included in the model, which explains the
vulnerability of power system in the results.
Network expansion based on planning for
uncorrelated failures yields vulnerabilities when
failtures are geographically correlated. Network
expansion based on planning for correlated failures
reduces unserved energy considerably, and in particular
mitigates the scenarios with the highest levels of
unserved energy demand. Network expansion based
on planning for GCF or UCF exhibit comparable
performance against uncorrelated failures. In part
this result is due to the large number of transmission
lines built under GCF planning. In other words, GCF
planning is effective at mitigating spatially uncorrelated
failures, but is not the most cost-effective way to
mitigate those risks. Simply planning for one type
of failure does not guarantee a robust energy system.
It is crucial to consider the geographically correlated
failures incuded by extreme weatehr and climate events
besides the uncorrelated failure in the planning process
for energy sector regulators and operators to achieve a
resilient energy system.
References
[1] DOE, “Climate change and the US energy sector:
Regional vulnerabilities and resilience solutions,” tech.
rep., October 2015.
[2] P. Hoffman and W. Bryan, “Comparing the impacts of
Page 3607
northeast hurricanes on energy infrastructure,” tech. rep.,
2013.
[3] Electric Reliability Council of Texas, “Review
of February 2021 extreme cold weather event.”




[4] C. Zamuda, B. Mignone, D. Bilello, K. Hallett, C. Lee,
J. Macknick, R. Newmark, and D. Steinberg, “US energy
sector vulnerabilities to climate change and extreme
weather,” tech. rep., Department of Energy Washington
DC, 2013.
[5] EPSA,DOE, “Climate change and the electricity sector
guide for assessing vulnerabilities and developing
resilience solutions to sea level rise,” tech. rep.,
Department of Energy Washington DC, 2016.
[6] D. N. Bresch, E. W. Group, et al., “Building a resilient
energy gulf coast: Executive report,” tech. rep., ETH
Zurich, 2010.
[7] E. Stein and A. Peltz, “Final order from NYPSC on
Con Edison rate case reveals especially encouraging
language on climate change directives.” Accessed on
April. 30 2021. [Online]. Available: http://blogs.
edf.org/energyexchange/, 2014.
[8] Edison Electric Institute, “Before and after the storm -
update. a compilation of recent studies, programs, and
policies related to storm hardening and resiliency,” tech.
rep., 2014.
[9] D. J. Wuebbles, D. W. Fahey, K. A. Hibbard, J. R.
Arnold, B. DeAngelo, S. Doherty, D. R. Easterling,
J. Edmonds, T. Edmonds, T. Hall, et al., “Climate science
special report: Fourth national climate assessment
(nca4), volume i,” 2017.
[10] Y. Yang, W. Tang, Y. Liu, Y. Xin, and Q. Wu,
“Quantitative resilience assessment for power
transmission systems under typhoon weather,” IEEE
Access, vol. 6, pp. 40747–40756, 2018.
[11] R. Rocchetta, Y. Li, and E. Zio, “Risk assessment and
risk-cost optimization of distributed power generation
systems considering extreme weather conditions,”
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 136,
pp. 47–61, 2015.
[12] S. Espinoza, M. Panteli, P. Mancarella, and H. Rudnick,
“Multi-phase assessment and adaptation of power
systems resilience to natural hazards,” Electric Power
Systems Research, vol. 136, pp. 352–361, 2016.
[13] A. Bernstein, D. Bienstock, D. Hay, M. Uzunoglu, and
G. Zussman, “Power grid vulnerability to geographically
correlated failures—analysis and control implications,”
in IEEE INFOCOM 2014-IEEE Conference on
Computer Communications, pp. 2634–2642, IEEE,
2014.
[14] C. Shao, M. Shahidehpour, X. Wang, X. Wang, and
B. Wang, “Integrated planning of electricity and natural
gas transportation systems for enhancing the power
grid resilience,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 4418–4429, 2017.
[15] J. Salmeron, K. Wood, and R. Baldick, “Analysis
of electric grid security under terrorist threat,” IEEE
Transactions on power systems, vol. 19, no. 2,
pp. 905–912, 2004.
[16] A. L. Motto, J. M. Arroyo, and F. D. Galiana, “A
mixed-integer lp procedure for the analysis of electric
grid security under disruptive threat,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 1357–1365, 2005.
[17] W. Yuan, J. Wang, F. Qiu, C. Chen, C. Kang,
and B. Zeng, “Robust optimization-based resilient
distribution network planning against natural disasters,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 6,
pp. 2817–2826, 2016.
[18] M. Panteli, C. Pickering, S. Wilkinson, R. Dawson,
and P. Mancarella, “Power system resilience to
extreme weather: fragility modeling, probabilistic
impact assessment, and adaptation measures,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 5,
pp. 3747–3757, 2016.
[19] M. Panteli and P. Mancarella, “Influence of extreme
weather and climate change on the resilience of power
systems: Impacts and possible mitigation strategies,”
Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 127, pp. 259–270,
2015.
[20] T. Lagos, R. Moreno, A. N. Espinosa, M. Panteli,
R. Sacaan, F. Ordonez, H. Rudnick, and P. Mancarella,
“Identifying optimal portfolios of resilient network
investments against natural hazards, with applications
to earthquakes,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 1411–1421, 2019.
[21] R. Billinton and P. Wang, “Teaching distribution system
reliability evaluation using monte carlo simulation,”
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 14, no. 2,
pp. 397–403, 1999.
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